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  1Individual Farming as a Labor Sink: Evidence from 
Poland and Russia 
 
Abstract 
In Poland and Russia, small-scale individual farms employ more labor per hectare of land
than large-scale corporate farms, without suffering from lower labor productivity. Individual
farming is a labor sink for the rural population, and land policies promoting individualization 
of agriculture in transition countries can alleviate the social consequences of rural
unemployment without sacrificing agricultural productivity.  
Keywords: transition agriculture, agricultural employment, individual farming, corporate 





In developing and developed countries, small-scale family farms are observed to 
use more labor per unit of land than large-scale corporate farms and consequently show a 
lower productivity of labor but a higher productivity of land. This phenomenon of higher 
intensity of labor use in individual farms is also observed for transition countries. 
Previous survey data, as presented in Table 1, have shown that individual (family) farms 
are characterized by a substantially higher “labor intensity” than corporate farms, i.e., 
large farm enterprises created from reorganizing collective and state farms in the process 
of economic reforms (Lerman 1998).  
 
Table 1. Labor Intensity in Individual and Corporate Farms in CIS (workers per 100 hectares) 
 Individual  farms  Corporate  farms 
Russia (1994)  4  2.5 
Ukraine (1996)  19  12 
Moldova (1998)  120  30 
Source: World Bank surveys for the period 1994-1998. 
 
This is surprising in the transition context, because large corporate farms are 
generally believed to have inherited a large contingent of surplus labor, which needs to be 
channeled out of agriculture in the course of transition with the objective of increasing 
sectoral productivity and efficiency. Yet, the creation of individual farms – one of the 
modes for reorganization of former collectives in transition countries – would seem to 
increase rather than decrease the agricultural labor force. Earlier work has indeed shown 
that agricultural employment increased significantly during transition in countries such as 
Albania, Armenia, Georgia, and Romania, where agricultural land was distributed to the 
rural population for individual farming (Lerman 1998, 2000). Thus, instead of channeling 
labor out of agriculture, the breakup of collective farms into individual units acts as a 
labor sink that effectively stores labor in agriculture. This effect may be of concern to 
policy makers because additional labor leads to further deterioration of agricultural labor 
  2productivity, at least in the short-run. We, on the other hand, argue that this effect has an 
important social impact in transition countries, where inadequate employment 
opportunities outside the farm sector may lead to serious social and political difficulties 
in case of massive exit of labor from agriculture. 
This paper examines how individualization of agriculture affects labor intensity 
and efficiency of agricultural production. We test two hypotheses: that individual farms 
are characterized by higher labor intensity than corporate farms, and that despite higher 
labor intensity individual farms achieve productivity levels that are not lower compared 
with corporate farms. The analysis is based on a cross-sectional comparison of Polish and 
Russian provinces in 1997-99. It is perhaps appropriate to stress that, in our conceptual 
approach, the difference between individual and corporate farms is not one of size. 
Although individual farms on average are smaller than corporate farms, it is the 
difference in incentives to owners and labor between the two forms of farm organization 
that counts in the present context. 
  The paper starts with a short overview of theoretical considerations concerning 
labor in agriculture. It proceeds to give relevant background information about Poland 
and Russia. This is followed by an examination of empirical evidence regarding higher 
labor intensity of individual agriculture. We then present results of a productivity 
analysis, which has been carried out in both the production function paradigm and the 
technical efficiency paradigm. In the concluding section the results are related to social 
implications, which ultimately brings us to formulate some policy implications for 
transition agriculture. 
 
Agricultural Labor in the Course of Transition 
 
For our analysis of labor in transition agriculture, two basic questions emerge that 
have been extensively dealt with in general non-transition literature. The first question is 
why labor stays in agriculture despite its apparently lower productivity compared to the 
other sectors? The second question is why there is a difference in labor intensity between 
large and small farms? This paper focuses only on the detection and implications of the 
second phenomenon. Yet the two questions are interrelated and the present section briefly 
explains the link and provides some theoretical background for these issues. 
In Poland, Russia, and many other transition countries, the share of people 
employed in agriculture exceeds this sector's contribution to GDP. This indicates that, in 
these countries, the productivity of labor in agriculture is substantially lower than in other 
sectors. An increase in agricultural labor productivity can be achieved through a 
combination of less workers per unit of land (i.e., lower labor intensity) and more output 
per unit of land (i.e., a better technology). The means to accomplish this are factor 
reallocation (e.g., lowering labor intensity by moving people out of agriculture) and 
technological change, with the optimal combination depending on the relative factor 
prices.  
If markets in transition countries functioned perfectly, one would expect people to 
flow out of agriculture because of its lower productivity. Labor intensity would decrease, 
marginal productivity of agricultural labor would increase, and simultaneously marginal 
productivity of non-agricultural labor would decrease until the wage rates of the two 
sectors converge to reflect the marginal productivity of labor equal for both sectors. 
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reveal the same problem. Although low agricultural productivity and associated low 
incomes should push people to leave agriculture, insufficient growth of the overall 
economy and the resulting high unemployment rates in the non-farm sectors constitute a 
barrier to out-migration. This is very similar to Schultz's (1945) observation of US 
agriculture in the 1930s: labor supply in agriculture increased considerably as a result of 
industrial unemployment during the Great Depression. In the transition context, 
agricultural employment has been shown to decline in countries where the overall 
economy grows faster than agriculture, i.e., GDP growth exceeds agricultural product 
growth (Lerman, Csaki, and Feder 2002, Ch. 3).  
Before turning our attention fully to Poland and Russia, let us briefly address the 
issue of differences in labor intensity between farms of different organizational forms. 
Micro-economic theory explains this phenomenon by the absence of functioning labor 
markets, e.g., due to relative insulation of rural life, high transportation costs, and lack of 
information, peasant households cannot realize the opportunity of higher non-farm labor 
revenues. Since peasant farmers are unable to allocate their excess labor time (i.e., the 
labor time that is unused at the point where marginal product of labor equals the wage 
rate) to off-farm employment, they instead allocate it to farm work, decreasing their 
marginal productivity of labor below the wage rate. Corporate farms, on the other hand, 
use hired labor and are more flexible in their labor decisions.  Consequently, they tend to 
use less labor per hectare and have a higher labor productivity that more accurately 




Poland is the largest Eastern European country outside the former Soviet Union, 
while Russia is essentially the core of the former USSR, dominating by its sheer size all 
the 20-odd transition countries in Europe and Central Asia. Judging by population and 
employment data, both Poland and Russia are agrarian countries. In Poland, 40% of the 
population is classified as rural and 27% of the labor force is reported as employed in 
agriculture. Russia is somewhat less agrarian, with 27% rural population and 13% 
agricultural employment. Despite its large share in employment, agriculture contributes 
less than 10% to gross value added in Poland and about 6% in Russia. Agriculture is thus 
tremendously important as a source of jobs for the rural population in both countries, but 
agricultural productivity is far below the average for the economy.  
Russian agriculture was sweepingly and forcibly collectivized in the early 1930s, 
yet individual agriculture did not disappear. During the entire Soviet period, up to the 
dissolution of the USSR in the fall of 1991, small-scale family farming continued in the 
form of household plots cultivated by employees of collective farms and other rural 
residents. A Russian household plot averaged less than half a hectare, and in aggregate 
the individual sector controlled less than 3% of agricultural land prior to 1991. The land 
reform program initiated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in November-
December 1991 doubled the size of the average household plot and in addition created an 
entirely new sector of independent private or peasant farms with average holdings of 40 
hectares. As a result of these processes, the share of individual producers in Russia 
increased from less than 3% to about 15% of agricultural land. 
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individual farms characterized most of the former socialist countries in Europe and 
Central Asia during the Soviet era. Contrary to this general pattern, Polish agriculture 
was not subjected to sweeping collectivization after World War II and individual farms 
have consistently controlled about 80% of agricultural land in this country. The relatively 
high share of labor in Polish agriculture compared to Russia (and other countries in the 
former Soviet Union) thus appears to be associated with a higher share of individual 
farming. This observation provides a prima facie support for our conjecture and 
motivates further analysis of this issue.  
Basic statistical information on agricultural employment and individual farming 
in Poland and Russia is available at the level of provinces: 49 “old” voivodships in 
Poland and 77 oblasts, territories (krais), and autonomous republics in Russia. The 
Russian data are for 1999 and are taken from official Goskomstat sources (2000, 2001). 
The Polish data are for 1997, which is the most recent year before the 49 provinces were 
amalgamated into 16 new administrative units, confusingly also called voivodships. The 
data for Poland are from GUS (1998). The provincial-level data used in our analysis of 
the labor-sink effect include the share of agricultural employment (in all individual and 
corporate farms in each province), the share of agricultural land controlled by individual 
farms, and the absolute level of agricultural land and agricultural labor in each province. 
The productivity analysis also uses data on value of regional agricultural product. 
In both countries, there is considerable variability in the basic indicators across 
the provinces. In Russia, with its huge territorial expanses and relatively monolithic 
history, the variability is primarily due to agro-climatic reasons, although regional 
politics (e.g., legislative autonomy of the republics) play a certain role. The 77 Russian 
provinces are traditionally grouped into 12 regions – strictly by geographical location. 
We aggregated these 12 regions into five macro-regions, again by geographical location 
roughly from west to east, and then into two “super-regions” – the agriculturally fertile 
central and southern parts of Russia (designated as Europe) and the less fertile northern 
and eastern parts (designated as North+East). In Poland, the variability is due not only to 
agro-climatic reasons, but also to significant historical and social differences. The 49 
voivodships are conventionally aggregated into eight “macro-regions,” which reflect 
historical, cultural, and geographical differences in the Polish society. The regions 
roughly divide the country into three “vertical” strips: the western strip, the central strip, 
and the eastern strip. The western strip generally corresponds to the “Recovered Lands” 
transferred from Germany to Poland when World War II ended in 1945 (Eastern 
Pomerania and Silesia). Parts of the eastern strip shifted several times between Poland 
and the USSR during 1918-45. Only the central regions remained under Polish 
sovereignty throughout the 20th century.  
  The main labor and farming characteristics of the macro-regions are presented in 
Table 2. In Poland, the western regions are characterized by relatively high levels of 
urbanization, while the eastern regions, conversely, are relatively more rural. In Russia, 
the agriculturally fertile central and southern regions (Caucasus and Europe) have a 
higher share of agriculturally oriented rural population than the less fertile North and 
East. In both countries, the share of agriculture in employment naturally increases with 
the share of rural population. Thus, in the rural eastern regions in Poland agriculture 
accounts for more than 40% of total employment, whereas in the more urban western 
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(although of smaller magnitude) is observed between the two super-regions in Russia. 
The levels of individual farming (as measured by the share of individual farms in 
total agricultural land) are generally high in Poland. This is so not only compared to 
Russia and the rest of CIS, where agriculture largely remains non-individual, but even 
compared to other Central and Eastern European countries, such as the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Yet by this measure also there is a clear 
polarization between the western regions and the rest of the country. In the North-West 
and the West, individual farms control less than 70% of agricultural land, whereas in 
central and eastern regions the share of individual farms is around 90% of agricultural 
land. History provides the accepted explanation for this phenomenon. The western parts 
of Poland were annexed from Germany after World War II and a large proportion of 
agricultural land in these regions, formerly owned by foreign nationals, was nationalized 
and used for the creation of large-scale state farms. As a result, the presence of individual 
farms in these regions is substantially smaller than in other parts of Poland, where Polish-
owned land was never nationalized and individual farming received a strong boost 
through the partitioning of large estates immediately after the war.  
 




Share of labor 
in agriculture, 
% 





per 1000 ha* 
Land sufficiency, 
hectares of land 
per rural resident* 
Poland (1997)         
North-West  33.4 16.8 68.3  146  1.8 
West  34.3 19.1 68.4  209  1.4 
Center-West  39.8 22.6 79.2  422  0.8 
Center 42.7  35.1 92.1  278  1.3 
Center-South 43.7 29.5 82.1  224  1.4 
North-East  47.9 43.1 88.4  188  2.1 
East  58.7 51.9 91.5  298  1.5 
South-East 56.9  44.8  89.6  546  0.8 
Russia (1999)         
Caucasus  46.2 22.2 13.0  174  1.5 
Europe  30.7 17.6 11.0  84  3.6 
East  32.3 15.7 11.7  67  3.8 
Far  East  28.1 10.3 18.1  153  1.7 
North 26.3  9.6  18.6 184  1.2 
Super  regions         
Europe  34.3 18.6 11.5  105  3.1 
North+East  29.2 12.1 15.8  128  2.3 
*Agricultural land for Poland; arable land for Russia. 
 
In Russia, the variability in the degree of individualization is determined by 
regional politics, not by history. Individual farming is more widespread in the less fertile 
North and Far East than in the agriculturally fertile center. This observation may appear 
somewhat paradoxical at a first glance, and yet it is consistent with previous findings 
regarding the relationship between regional reform policies and the share of agriculture in 
regional product. It has been shown that the more agricultural regions in Russia tend to be 
more conservative, emphasizing the traditional collective agriculture at the expense of 
reforms that promote individual farming (Lerman, Csaki, and Feder 2002, Ch. 3). The 
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where local authorities find it easier to extract rents and benefits from a relatively small 
number of large collective farms than from a multitude of family farms, explains the 
relatively low degrees of individualization in Russia’s fertile center. 
 
Labor Intensity and Individualization of Agriculture 
 
The grouped regional data for Poland in Table 2 show a positive correlation 
between the share of agriculture in employment and the degree of individualization in 
agriculture. The western regions with weak individual farming are characterized by low 
agricultural employment, while eastern and central parts of Poland, where private 
farming is more widespread, show higher levels of employment in agriculture. This 
tentative conclusion is corroborated by the cross-sectional data for all 49 voivodships: the 
share of agriculture in employment increases with the increase of individual farming, as 
measured by the share of individual farms in agricultural land (the correlation coefficient 
between the two variables is 0.68).  
While this preliminary observation for Poland is consistent with our view of 
individual farms as a labor sink, no such direct correlation between the share of 
agriculture in employment and the degree of individualization is observed for Russia. 
Aggregated data for super-regions actually show an inverse relationship: the relatively 
high share of agricultural employment in the central super-region (Europe) is associated 
with a relatively low degree of individualization. We accordingly continue the analysis 
by examining the relationship between “labor intensity”, i.e., the number of workers per 
hectare, and the share of individual farms in agricultural land. These two variables 
generally give the expected relationship for Russia’s super-regions and macro-regions in 
Table 2: higher labor intensity is associated with higher individualization. Yet for Poland 
these variables do not show a clear pattern in regionally aggregated data. True, the 
western regions with their relatively small individual farming sector are characterized by 
low “labor intensity”, and the South-East with a substantially higher share of individual 
farms in land is characterized by much higher “labor intensity”. Yet the “labor intensity” 
in the central and eastern regions is comparable to that in the western regions despite a 
much higher level of individual farming. A similar, though less pronounced, departure 
from the general relationship is observed in Russia, where the Caucasus region has the 
highest labor intensity and only a medium degree of individualization.  
Examination of the last two columns in Table 2 suggests a possible direction for 
further analysis of labor intensity. We see that the regions with the highest labor intensity 
(South-East and Center-West in Poland; North and Caucasus in Russia) have the lowest 
“land sufficiency”: less than 1 hectare per rural resident in Poland and up to 1.5 hectare in 
Russia. If there is not enough land, then we can naturally expect more rural people to be 
employed per hectare. Whether or not these people are employed efficiently is a different 
question to be dealt with in the next section. What concerns us in the present context is 
that they are employed on the farm and are not ejected into the unemployment pool.  
To test the hypothesis that regions with a higher level of individual farming show 
higher labor intensity we use two regression models for Poland and Russia. One model 
examines labor intensity as a function of the share of individual farming in land, the total 
amount of farmland in the region, and the size of the rural population. The second model 
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measured by hectares of farmland per rural resident. The regressions were run separately 
for the two countries because of large differences in scale and in other factors. The 
regression results are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Determinants of Labor Intensity  
  Poland (1997)  Russia (1999) 
  Model 1  Model 2   Model 1  Model 2 








Intercept 59.1  371.6***  85.21128***  177.18256***
Share of individual farming (%)  2.54***  2.67***  3.68141**  2.37056* 
Total farmland (1000ha)  -0.70627***  --  -0.04263***  -- 
Rural  population  (000s)  0.96949*** --  0.09980*** -- 
Land sufficiency (ha per rural resident)  --  -217.5***  --  -33.29669*** 
R-square  0.81 0.72 0.37 0.46 
*** signif. at p=0.01; ** signif. at p=0.05; * signif. at p=0.1 
Note: Agricultural land for Poland; arable land for Russia. 
 
The results clearly show that for both countries in both models, the labor intensity 
increases with the increase in the share of individual farming when we control for total 
farmland and total rural population (or, alternatively, for land sufficiency in hectares per 
rural resident). Also we see that for a given level of individual farming, labor intensity 
decreases with the increase of land sufficiency. If more land is available per rural 
resident, this tends to reduce the number of workers per hectare (for a given level of 
individual farming). This conclusion based on model 2 is consistent with the results of 
model 1: if more land is available (for a given rural population), the labor intensity 
declines; if the rural population is larger (for a given amount of farmland), the labor 
intensity increases.  
Figure 1 plots, for Poland, the relationship between labor intensity and the share 
of individual farming adjusted for the effect of agricultural land and rural population 
according to model 1. The diagram shows a clear increase in labor intensity with the 
increase in the share of individual farming when we control for land sufficiency of the 
rural population. Consistently with general econometric considerations, the slope of the 
fitted line in Figure 1 is b=2.5, the same as the regression coefficient of the 
individualization variable in full model 1 (see Table 3). The same pattern is observed for 
Russia (with b=3.7), although the fit is somewhat poorer. That the effect is less strong for 
Russia can partly be attributed to our use of agricultural land in individual use as the 
variable measuring individualization; the difference between arable and agricultural land 
is much greater for Russia than for Poland and it is arable land on which most labor is 
employed. Similar regressions using the share of sown land under four major crops 
(grain, sunflower, potato and vegetable) in individual farms have shown very strong 
significant effects of the individualization factor on the labor intensity.   
 




Having confirmed our first hypothesis of higher labor intensity in regions with a 
higher level of individualization, we now turn to our second hypothesis that regions with 
a higher level of individual farming do not show a lower efficiency of agricultural 
production. Unfortunately, no regional production data for Poland are available to test 
this hypothesis and we have to rely on data for Russia. 
 
Production Function Approach 
 
  To establish the effect of individualization on agricultural productivity, we run 
two regression models in the Cobb-Douglas production function framework. Model A 
uses total agricultural production as the dependent variable and regresses it on total arable 
land, agricultural labor, the size of the livestock herd, and the individualization factor 
expressed as the percent of agricultural land in individual use (the variable pind_lnd). 
Model B uses agricultural labor productivity as the dependent variable and divides the 
factor variables by agricultural labor. The transition to per-worker variables is valid, 
because the full model (Model A) shows constant returns to scale. All variables are 
logged (except the individualization measure). The regression results are presented in 
Table 4. 
Individualization of agriculture makes a positive and significant contribution 
(p=0.01) to both total agricultural production and labor productivity while controlling for 
total farmland, total labor, and the composition of production (as represented by the 
livestock herd). This shows that regions with higher individualization of agriculture 
perform better by measures of total agricultural output and agricultural labor productivity. 
The increase in labor productivity is observed despite the fact that labor intensity 
increases with the degree of individualization. In regions with a more prominent 
individual sector, output grows faster than agricultural labor. Despite acting as a labor 
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level when land, labor, and livestock are considered as the main factors of production.  
 
Table 4. Production Function: Russia 
Model A: Ln(ag product) = pind_lnd  + ln(arable land) + ln(ag labor) + ln(livestock) (n=76) 
Model B: Ln(ag product/ag labor) = pind_lnd  + ln(arable land/ag labor)  + ln(livestock/ag labor) (n=76) 
Dependent:  Agricultural production  Agricultural labor productivity 
  Model A1#  Model A2  Model A3  Model B1  Model B2  Model B3 
Intercept  4.41735*** 4.05879*** 4.26164*** 11.00520***  10.64859***  10.84502*** 
Pind_lnd  -- 0.01678***  0.01635**  -- 0.01714***  0.01666** 
Arable  land  0.03583 0.08391 0.13567*  -0.03918  0.01215 0.06403 
Ag  labor  0.66179*** 0.60517*** 0.75076*  --  --  -- 
Livestock 0.20055* 0.21206* --  0.24867**  0.25899**  -- 















# The hypothesis of constant returns to scale (sum of coefficients = 1) is not rejected at p=0.01. 
*** signif. at p=0.01; ** signif. at p=0.05; * signif. at p=0.1 
Note: Share of land in individual use (pind_lnd) in percent, ag product in million rubles, land in 1000 ha, 
labor in 1000s, and livestock in 1000 head of cattle.  
 
These results are illustrated in Figure 2, which plots agricultural production and 
agricultural labor productivity against the level of individualization. The agricultural 
production line is based on model A3, i.e., it is adjusted for arable land and agricultural 
labor. The productivity line is based on model B3, which did not require any adjustment 
(the coefficient of land in this model is not significant). Exclusion of the three outliers 
with individualization higher than 30% does not affect the significance of the model and 
actually improves the R-square. 
Figure 2.
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The production function analysis, which showed that labor productivity increases with 
increasing individualization, was supplemented with technical efficiency analysis 
conducted using two standard algorithms: the non-parametric Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and the parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Both algorithms 
produce technical efficiency scores (with values between 0 and 1) that measure the 
closeness of the observation points to the empirical production frontier representing the 
best production bundles (input-output combinations) achievable in the sample. A 
technical efficiency score of 1 implies that the observation is on the production frontier. 
As the score decreases below 1, the observation corresponds to a less efficient production 
bundle.  
The analysis was conducted using land and labor as the inputs and the value of 
agricultural production as the output (the equivalent of model A3 in production function 
analysis). The technical efficiency scores produced by the two algorithms were found to 
increase with the increase of the level of individualization in Russia’s provinces. Table 5 
presents the mean technical efficiency scores for three individualization categories: up to 
10% agricultural land in individual use; 10-20% agricultural land in individual use; and 
over 20% agricultural land in individual use. The mean technical efficiency scores 
increase monotonically as the level of individualization rises. In simultaneous pairwise 
comparisons, the differences are statistically significant between the first 
individualization category and each of the other individualization categories.  
 
Table 5. Technical Efficiency Scores by Individualization Levels: Russia 
Individualization category*  Number of observations  DEA  SFA 
Up to 10%   27  0.53  0.61 
10-20%   38  0.65  0.69 
Over 20%   10  0.71  0.76 




Using regional data for Poland and Russia, we have shown that the phenomenon 
of higher labor intensity in family farming also prevails in transition agriculture, where a 
priori we would expect former collective farms to suffer from excess labor. A cross-
regional comparison convincingly showed that regions with a higher incidence of 
individual farming have a higher share of their total labor force in agriculture, i.e., 
individual farming acts as a labor sink for the rural population. Moreover, we 
demonstrated for Russia that regions with a higher level of individualization, while 
employing relatively more labor, achieve productivity and efficiency levels that are 
definitely not lower than those of regions with less individual farming.   
  In a sense, individual farming is a barrier against rural-to-urban migration. Such 
barriers have a negative connotation, as in developed market economies they are believed 
to perpetuate rural poverty. Yet in transition economies such barriers are not necessarily 
bad. As long as there are insufficient employment opportunities in urban areas, it may be 
beneficial to keep the rural population employed in agriculture. Low incomes from 
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individual agriculture may be better than no income at all for the urban unemployed. 
Preliminary results of some additional analyses indicate that higher regional 
unemployment rates lead to higher labor intensities in agriculture. We argue in effect that 
individual farming compensates for insufficient non-farm employment opportunities and 
creates a safety net for the rural population by ensuring a certain level of income, which 
may be low but is preferable to no income at all.  
These conclusions lead to a clear policy advice to transition countries, and 
especially to CIS: as long as non-agricultural employment opportunities in towns and in 
rural areas remain undeveloped, land policies should be aimed to encourage 
individualization of agriculture. Very small individual farms may be inefficient (although 
the jury is still out on this question), but at least they provide employment and food – a 
basic safety net that the rural population desperately needs in the absence of adequate 
unemployment-benefit programs in transition countries. Not every transition country is 
Germany, which could afford to achieve dramatic improvements in farming efficiency in 
the new eastern states at the expense of forcing three-quarters of the labor force out of 
agriculture and putting it (at least temporarily) on social security (Koester and Brooks 
1997). The average transition country should probably encourage the rural population to 
remain in agriculture, pending long-term development of non-agricultural employment 
opportunities. Our results seem to indicate that individual farming provides a good recipe 
for this strategy. The time to focus on farming efficiency will come when overall 
economic growth reaches levels that generate sufficient off-farm employment 
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